RELAYLINE / DOCUMENTATION

Build for continuity.
Understand the trust.

Everything you need to publish a recovery record, discover authorized destinations, and evaluate RelayLine's security model and hackathon evidence.

01 / INTRODUCTION

What is RelayLine?

RelayLine is an experimental service-recovery prototype on the Arkiv Tiramisu testnet. A publisher signs a public manifest describing the service's primary and alternate HTTPS destinations. A separate reader can later query Arkiv directly for the publisher's currently authorized recovery record.

The reader requires a service ID and a publisher wallet confirmed through an independent trusted source. RelayLine does not currently provide a globally verified directory of businesses or websites.
02 / QUICK START

Getting started

For publishers

Use an EVM-compatible wallet on Arkiv Tiramisu. You'll need test GLM to approve a publication transaction.

Open your workspace

For readers

No connected wallet is required. Bring a service ID and a publisher wallet address you have independently authenticated.

Open recovery reader

To obtain testnet tokens, use the official Arkiv faucet. Never provide a private key or seed phrase to RelayLine or another website.

03 / PUBLISHING

Publish or update a service

  1. Connect your publishing wallet. The workspace queries public Arkiv records created by the connected account.
  2. Select “Publish new service”. Enter a service ID, primary HTTPS URL, and alternate HTTPS URL in the workspace's guided three-step flow.
  3. Review and approve. A wallet transaction is required; no record is written until you explicitly authorize it.
  4. Verify the result. Check the transaction and use the independent recovery reader to confirm that the latest record can be retrieved.

To update an existing active record, use its Edit signed record action. This is subject to the current authorization and revision checks; connecting a wallet by itself does not establish ownership of any service name.

Read the publication protocol
04 / RECOVERY

Find an authorized route

  1. Enter the service ID. Use the identifier provided by the service publisher.
  2. Authenticate the publisher out-of-band. Obtain the publisher's wallet address through a trusted channel, not solely through an unverified recovery link.
  3. Pin and verify the wallet. The reader applies the current authorization policy to public Arkiv records.
  4. Inspect the destinations. Check the signed primary and alternate URLs, control records, and any available independent observation evidence.

A link carrying ?service= and ?publisher= values can prefill the reader. Those values are convenience parameters, not publisher identity proof.

05 / TRUST MODEL

Verification is not endorsement

An Arkiv creator signature associates a public record with a signing wallet. It does not prove that the wallet belongs to a particular company or controls a domain name. Readers must independently trust a publisher root wallet, and verify applicable revision, rotation, expiry and revocation conditions.

When monitoring evidence is missing, reachability remains unknown. Disputed observations aren't proof of censorship, and a valid fallback URL may be unreachable.

Read the security model
06 / ARCHITECTURE

Designed for independent reading

The hosted GitHub Pages experience contains both the publisher workspace and the reader. The reader's code queries public Arkiv RPC rather than a RelayLine application backend. A separately hosted read-only reader can additionally demonstrate host separation, but the GitHub Pages reader alone does not survive an outage of its own host.

Read the technical architecture
07 / VALIDATION

Reproduce the hackathon demo

The repository includes test commands, direct-chain evidence, threat-model notes, and reproduction guidance. Review the records before making security or availability claims based on the prototype.

08 / IMPORTANT NOTES

Known limitations

RelayLine is a testnet prototype, not an independently audited production recovery service. Records can expire or be removed; new readers may lack past revocation history; public RPC availability is an external dependency; and service reachability is not automatically established by a wallet signature.

These limits are part of the model we want judges and developers to inspect. For full explanations, see Security and Monitoring.